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Precarious Citizenship:
Asian Immigrant Naturalization 1918 to
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Abstract
During the height of the exclusion era, when Asian
immigrants were prohibited from naturalizing and becoming
United States citizens, state and federal court judges around the
country naturalized at least 500 Asian immigrant servicepersons
and veterans. Between 1918 and 1925, Federal Bureau of
Naturalization officials and state and federal court judges had to
determine whether the military naturalization provisions enacted
in 1918 included the same racial restrictions that the general
naturalization provisions included. This Article tells the story of
how these officials and judges navigated statutory text,
congressional intent, and the reality of Asian immigrant
membership in the United States Armed Forces to determine the
role that race vis-à-vis military service should play in determining
citizenship eligibility.
The story of Asian immigrant naturalization between 1918
and 1925 highlights a long-standing question within American
citizenship and immigration law: how to measure an applicant’s
adoption of and commitment to mainstream American values,
norms, and practices. Are there accurate and reliable categories
that measure cultural assimilation and allow for cost-effective and
efficient decision-making? Alternatively, are categories sufficiently
inaccurate and unreliable such that individualized assessments of
specific cultural criteria offer the only legitimate approach? Based
on administrative memos, state and federal court judicial opinions,
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and newspaper articles, this article reveals how state and federal
court judges struggled with this general question and how the
Supreme Court resolved the split that existed across the country.
United States naturalization law continues to require categorybased decision-making, and it is important that we similarly
interrogate those categories to determine the extent to which they
accurately and reliably measure the intended naturalization
criteria.

Introduction
Between 1790 and 1952, federal law prohibited Asian
immigrants from naturalizing to become United States citizens.1
Yet, between 1918 and 1925, at least 500 Asian immigrants became
United States citizens.2 State and federal court judges across the
country granted these individuals’ naturalization petitions based on
their service in the United States Armed Forces.3 The exclusion of
Asian immigrants from naturalization was based on the idea that
Asian immigrants were unassimilable—no matter how much time
they spent in the United States, they would neither adopt nor
commit to mainstream American values, norms, and practices.4 Yet
1. See 1790 Naturalization Act ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed 1795)
(“[A]ny alien, being a free white person . . . may be admitted to become a citizen
thereof.”); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (eliminating
race requirements in naturalization laws); see also Yuji Ichioka, The Early Japanese
Immigrant Quest for Citizenship: The Background of the 1922 Ozawa Case, 4
AMERASIA J. 1, 1 (1977) (“Denied the right of naturalization, Japanese immigrants
were so-called ‘aliens ineligible to citizenship’ for decades . . . until the McCarran Act
of 1952 altered their legal status and finally admitted them into citizenship.”).
2. See JAPANESE AM. NAT’L MUSEUM, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPANESE AMERICAN
HISTORY: AN A TO Z REFERENCE FROM 1868 TO THE PRESENT 46 (Brian Niiya ed.,
2001).
3. See Japanese in Army Entitled to Citizenship, Star Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1918, in
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, file 106799/926, entry 26,
National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Naturalization Administrative
Files] (“Japanese, Chinese and Koreans, serving in the United States army or navy
are eligible to become citizens of the United States.”); Memorandum from Deputy
Comm’r of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist to Commissioner Richard K. Campbell
(Dec. 24, 1918) (on file with Naturalization Administrative Files) (supporting Judge
Vaughn’s decisions to confirm citizenship); In re Saichi Shimodao at *8 (D. Terr.
Haw.) (Mar. 17, 1919) (on file with Naturalization Administrative Files) (“The
petitioner is in the military service of the United States; and the provision of the
seventh subdivision of the Act of May 9, 1918 authorize[s] his naturalization though
he is of the Japanese race.”).
4. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING
OF MODERN AMERICA 8 (William Chafe et al. eds., 2004) (“The legal racialization of
these ethnic groups’ national origin cast them as permanently foreign and
unassimilable to the nation.”); Angela M. Banks, Respectability & the Quest for
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the enlistment and military service of Asian immigrants
contradicted this assumption. Bureau of Naturalization officials
and state and federal court judges were faced with this
contradiction when hundreds of Asian immigrant servicepersons
and veterans sought to naturalize pursuant to the military
naturalization provisions in the 1918 Naturalization Act.5 These
provisions appeared to repeal the racial requirements for
servicepersons and veterans.6 Based on original archival research,
this Article tells the story of how administrative officials and state
and federal court judges navigated statutory text, congressional
intent, and the reality of Asian immigrant membership in the
United States Armed Forces to determine if Asian immigrants
would remain “permanently foreign.”7
One of the boundaries that separates citizens and noncitizens
is culture—values, norms, and practices. Since America’s founding,
naturalization eligibility criteria have sought to evaluate
noncitizens’ adherence and commitment to mainstream American
culture.8 Those criteria have included factors such as race, length of
residence, knowledge of United States history and civics, and
oaths.9 The story of Asian immigrants’ naturalization between 1918
Citizenship, 83 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 39–44 (2017) (“Concerns about social unrest
were most often expressed as concerns about the inability of Chinese immigrants to
assimilate.”); Lucy E. Salyer, Baptism by Fire: Race, Military Service, and U.S.
Citizenship Policy, 1918–1935, 91 J. AM. HIST. 847, 848 (Dec. 2004) (“Such
determinations often rested on the presumption that Asians would remain always
‘yellow at heart,’ that they would not, and could not, assimilate.”).
5. See Naturalization Act of 1918, ch. 69, § 7, 40 Stat. 542, 542–44 (1918)
(expanding the race requirement for naturalization to Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, and
potentially “any alien” who served in the armed forces, which would include those
who served and were of Asian descent); JAPANESE AM. NAT’L MUSEUM, supra note 2,
at 46.
6. E.g., In re Saichi Shimodao at *8 (“The petitioner is in the military service of
the United States; and the provision of the seventh subdivision of the Act of May 9,
1918 authorize[s] his naturalization though he is of the Japanese race.”);
Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist to Secretary
of Labor (May 11, 1921) (on file with Naturalization Administrative Files)
(advocating for the 1918 Naturalization Act to be read allowing for the naturalization
of United States veterans of Asian descent).
7. NGAI, supra note 4, at 8.
8. E.g., Deenesh Sohoni & Amin Vafa, The Fight to Be American: Military
Naturalization and Asian Citizenship, 17 ASIAN AM. L.J. 119, 126 (2010) (citing
JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, 243
(1978) (“Typically, the naturalization process involved a waiting period of several
years, during which aliens served an apprenticeship to allow the individual
immigrant to become firmly attached to the well-being of the Republic. This ensured
that individuals could demonstrate their loyalty and allegiance, key qualities
necessary for constructing and maintaining national unity.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
9. See, e.g., 1906 Naturalization Act, Pub. L. No. 59-338, ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596,
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and 1925 highlights a long-standing question within American
citizenship and immigration law: how to measure an applicant’s
adoption of and commitment to mainstream American values,
norms, and practices. Are there accurate and reliable categories
that measure cultural assimilation and allow for cost-effective and
efficient decision making? Alternatively, are categories sufficiently
inaccurate and unreliable such that individualized assessments of
specific cultural criteria offer the only legitimate approach? Based
on administrative memos, state and federal court judicial opinions,
and newspaper articles, this article reveals how state and federal
court judges struggled with this general question and how the
Supreme Court resolved the split that existed across the country.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents a brief
history of the statutory law and case law that made Asian
immigrants ineligible for naturalization and thus “permanently
foreign.”10 Part II presents the history of military naturalization in
the United States and examines the purpose of the provisions. Part
III details the analysis that Bureau of Naturalization officials and
state and federal court judges used to evaluate the legitimacy of
various categorical eligibility requirements. Relying on plain
meaning interpretations of the statute and congressional intent,
many judges and administrative officials concluded that the
statutory language clearly used race as a categorical eligibility
requirement and that Asian immigrants were therefore ineligible.11
The judges that naturalized Asian immigrant servicepersons and
veterans relied on the same interpretive tools. However, they
concluded that the statutory language was either similarly clear in
eliminating the racial requirements or the text was ambiguous and
596–99 (1906).
10. NGAI, supra note 4, at 8.
11. See, e.g., Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402, 412 (1925) (“The legislative
history of the act indicates that the intention of Congress was not to enlarge § 2169,
except in respect of Filipinos qualified by the specified service.”); United States v.
Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213 (1923) (“The words of familiar speech, which were used by
the original framers of the law, were intended to include only the type of man whom
they knew as white.”); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (holding
“white person” applied to the Caucasian race and did not encompass the Japanese);
In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding a man of both Indian and
African race did not constitute as a man of “African nativity” or “African descent”
under the statute because “African descent must be shown to be at least an
affirmative quantity, and not a neutral thing as in the case of the half blood, or a
negative one as in the case of the one-quarter blood.”); In re Charr, 273 F. 207, 213
(W.D. Mo. 1921) (denying Korean veteran of the United States Army citizenship
because “the provisions of the draft law clearly did not contemplate the incorporation
of those not eligible to citizenship into the land and naval forces of the United States.
That such may have been inducted into the service through voluntary enlistment or
inadvertence of draft boards cannot affect the purpose of Congress.”).
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immigrant servicepersons and veterans should get the benefit of the
ambiguity in light of their clear demonstration of loyalty and
commitment to the United States.12
The analysis provided in this Article reveals how citizenship
decision makers have navigated the challenges associated with
categorical eligibility requirements in the citizenship context.
Categories vary in their accuracy and reliability, and the case study
of the naturalization of Asian immigrant servicepersons and
veterans illustrates that the inaccuracy and unreliability of race
was recognized, even if not completely accepted, in the 1920s.
United States naturalization law continues to require categorybased decision-making. It is important that we similarly interrogate
those categories to determine the extent to which they accurately
and reliably measure the intended naturalization criteria.13
I.

Permanently Foreign

Between 1790 and 1952, Asian immigrants were what
historian Mae Ngai has referred to as “permanently foreign.”14
Immigrants who were able to enter the United States despite the
Chinese Exclusion Act or the Asiatic Barred Zone created by the
1924 Immigration Act were not able to naturalize and become
citizens.15 Federal law prohibited the naturalization of Asian
immigrants. In 1918, Congress amended the 1906 Naturalization
Act to harmonize the provisions regarding the naturalization of
immigrants serving in the United States Armed Forces.16 The
language used in the 1918 amendments raised the possibility that

12. See, e.g., In re Mohan Singh, 257 F. 209, 212 (1919) (holding that scientific
studies of ethnology determined Hindus were of the Caucasian or Aryan race, and
thus without more clarity from Congress, petitioner, a Hindu, would be admitted to
citizenship). See In re Saichi Shimodao at *8; Letter from Richard M. Sato to Comm’r
of Naturalization Richard K. Campbell, (Feb. 8, 1919) (on file with the Naturalization
Administrative Files) (stating that Congress intended the 1918 Naturalization Act
to reward aliens for their loyalty and service during World War I, and without
further clarity, Judge Sheppard would continue to confirm citizenship to United
States veterans of Asian descent).
13. See Banks, supra note 4, at 1–2 n.5 (discussing recent Executive Orders
prohibiting Iraqi and Syrian refugees and citizens from entering the United States).
14. NGAI, supra note 4, at 8.
15. See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58, 61(repealed by
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)) (“That hereafter no
State court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship; and all
laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.”); see also Ichioka, supra note 1, at
2 (discussing how naturalization statutes barring Asians from citizenship “formed
the legal framework of the Ozawa case.”).
16. See Naturalization Act of 1918, ch. 69, § 7, 40 Stat. 542, 542–43 (describing
procedures for naturalization of immigrant servicepersons).
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the military naturalization provisions did not include racial
prerequisites.17 In the midst of World War I, Asian immigrant
servicepersons and veterans seized upon this possibility and
applied to become United States citizens.18 The manner in which
officials within the Bureau of Naturalization and state and federal
court judges responsible for granting or denying naturalization
petitions decided Asian immigrants’ eligibility was tied to the
historical treatment of Asian immigrants in United States
naturalization law.19 The following sections provide a history of the
prominent role race has played in U.S. naturalization law through
federal statutes and Supreme Court cases interpreting the racial
requirements.
A. Naturalization Statutes
Naturalization law in the United States has sought to limit
access to citizenship to those noncitizens who are least likely to
threaten America’s political experiment and who would add “to the
wealth and strength” of the country.20 Since 1790, in order to
naturalize, an individual must have resided in the United States for
a specified period of time, be a person of good moral character, and
support the United States Constitution.21 Over the past two
centuries, additional requirements have existed and some of them
17. See Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist
to Commissioner Richard K. Campbell, supra note 3; Letter from Richard M. Sato to
Comm’r of Naturalization Richard K. Campbell, supra note 12.
18. See JAPANESE AM. NAT’L MUSEUM, supra note 2.
19. Compare Thind, 261 U.S. at 215 (“This not only constitutes conclusive
evidence of the congressional attitude of opposition to Asiatic immigration generally,
but is persuasive of a similar attitude toward Asiatic naturalization as well, since it
is not likely that Congress would be willing to accept as citizens a class of persons
whom it rejects as immigrants.”), with In re Soon Nahm Ahn (D. Terr. Haw.) (on file
with Naturalization Administrative Files) (“If it was not the intention of Congress
thereby to provide equal treatment, or at least fair treatment for all aliens in our
service, I am unable to perceive what Congress did intend.”).
20. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1039–1040, 1111 (1790) (statement of Rep. Madison)
(advocating for the naturalization of only economically attractive aliens); KETTNER,
supra note 8, at 241–42 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1064, 1065 (1795) (statement
of Rep. Smith). Kettner contends that in 1795 there was a shared assumption within
Congress that a residence longer than two years should be required so that
“prejudices which the aliens had imbibed under the Government from whence they
came might be effaced, and that they might, by communication and observance of
our laws and government, have just ideas of our Constitution and the excellence of
its institution before they were admitted to the rights of a citizen.” Id. at 1065.
21. See, e.g., 1790 Naturalization Act ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed 1795)
(creating a two-year residency requirement); 1795 Naturalization Act, ch. 20 § 1, 1
Stat. 414, 414 (1795) (creating a five year residence requirement, a good moral
character requirement, and a requirement to be “attached to the principles of the
constitution of the United States . . . .”).
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remain today. For example, naturalization law has had an English
language requirement since 1906,22 a knowledge of United States
history and government since 1952,23 and racial restrictions
between 1790 and 1952.24 Naturalization requirements
operationalize the state’s conception of who should be full members
of the polity and evaluate applicants based on their adoption of and
commitment to mainstream American values, norms, and
practices.25 The requirements “reflect deep-seated societal views of
who belongs.”26
Legislative debates during the 1790s reveal that members of
Congress were concerned that America’s democratic experiment
could be threatened by foreign residents’ values, norms, and
practices.27 Members of Congress wanted to ensure that future
citizens were “fit for self-government.”28 The naturalization
requirements adopted at that time were viewed as limiting access
to citizenship to those noncitizens who were unlikely to threaten
America’s political experiment.29 The concern about new citizens
threatening the political life of the United States expanded to a
concern about American social and economic life as well by 1870.30
Concerns about future citizens threatening mainstream American
political, social, and economic life have been addressed by
incorporating
cultural
assimilation
requirements
into
naturalization law.

22. 1906 Naturalization Act, Pub. L. No. 59-338, ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596,
599(1906).
23. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 239–40 (1952)
(creating a knowledge of history and government requirement).
24. See, e.g., 1 Stat. 103, 103 (instituting a race requirement); 1870
Naturalization Act, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870) (stating that “naturalization
laws are hereby extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African
descent.”).
25. See Banks, supra note 4, at 14 (“Senators Williams, Corbett, and Stewart
believed that Chinese immigrants’ values, norms, and practices were incompatible
with American democracy and mainstream American culture. They used these
perceived differences as justification for denying Chinese immigrants access to U.S.
citizenship.”); Ichioka, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Takao Ozawa, Naturalization of a
Japanese Subject, undated brief, JARP, JFMAD, reel 39) (explaining a JapaneseAmerican petitioner’s commitment to mainstream American values).
26. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, &
MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS & POLICY 110 (West
Publishing Co. eds., 7th ed. 2012).
27. See, e.g., KETTNER, supra note 8, at 235 (exploring how “[s]uspicion of the
foreign-born and a belief that citizenship conferred political rights combined to shape
the development of a federal naturalization policy in the 1790s.”).
28. Banks, supra note 4, at 25.
29. See KETTNER, supra note 8, at 241–42.
30. Id. at 235.
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United States naturalization law has conditioned citizenship
upon evidence of a willingness and ability to adopt mainstream
American values, norms, and practices.31 At times this condition
has been explicit and at other times implicit. Naturalization
requirements—such as demonstrating the adoption of “the habits of
civilized life” or English language skills—are explicit cultural
assimilation
requirements.32
Racial
requirements
for
naturalization
represent
implicit
cultural
assimilation
requirements. These requirements use race as a category for
evaluating values, norms, or practices rather than evaluating each
individual candidate based on criteria that directly measure the
desired values, norms, and practices. Other categories are used to
measure cultural assimilation within naturalization law like
military service, marriage to a United States citizen, and lawful
immigration status.33 Each of these categories is viewed as an
accurate and reliable measure of an individual’s commitment to
democracy and the rule of law, belief in individualism, selfsufficiency, Christian beliefs and morals, and English-language
skills. These are values, norms, and practices that citizenship
decision makers have deemed important for future United States
citizens.34
Members of Congress were doubtful that “the subjects of all
Governments, Despotic, Monarchical, and Aristocratical, are, as
soon as they set foot on American ground, qualified to participate in
administering the sovereignty of our country.”35 Congress adopted
naturalization requirements that would limit the ability of those
without the desired political character to become United States
citizens.36 Congress addressed this concern through two particular
categorical requirements: length of residence and race.
Residence requirements were used because there was a sense
that time in the United States would allow immigrants to develop
the desired political character.37 These concerns are evident in the
31. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 239–40 (1952).
32. See Banks, supra note 4, at 25–26, n.26.
33. See discussion infra Part II.
34. See Banks, supra note 4, at 25 (“Within the immigration and citizenship
context, legal decision makers have emphasized six aspects of American culture as
being imperative for future citizens to possess. They are a commitment to democracy,
adherence to the rule of law, Christian beliefs and morals, English-language skills,
self- sufficiency, and a belief in individualism.”).
35. KETTNER, supra note 8, at 240 (quoting Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts).
36. See Banks, supra note 4, at 11–14 (discussing Congressional fear and bias in
relation to the 1870 Naturalization Act).
37. See KETTNER, supra note 8, at 218 (describing how residence requirements
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1790 naturalization requirements. Only a noncitizen who had
resided in the United States for two years was eligible to
naturalize.38
Members of Congress had less confidence in the power of time
to socialize non-White immigrants. Between 1790 and 1870 only
noncitizens who were “free white person[s]” were eligible to
naturalize.39 In 1870 this racial requirement was expanded to
include noncitizens of “African descent” and “African nativity.”40
Chinese immigrants became eligible to naturalize in 1942 but all
racial requirements were not eliminated.41 Immigrants of color
were viewed as having unchangeable and dangerous values, norms,
and practices different from those of mainstream American citizens.
No amount of time in the United States was thought to enable these
immigrants to develop the desired political character. This led
Congress to make these immigrants categorically ineligible for
naturalization, and thus “permanently foreign.”42
In 1870, the perception that Black immigrants were
permanently and dangerously different had dissipated, but it held
steady for Asian immigrants. That year, Senator Charles Sumner
of Massachusetts moved to amend the naturalization law by
removing the “white person” requirement.43 During the floor
debates about this proposed amendment, Black immigrants and
Chinese immigrants were discussed in great detail. Congress
agreed to make immigrants of African nativity or descent eligible
for citizenship but denied that opportunity to Asian immigrants.44
existed when state law governed naturalization and they were based on the
assumption that “the exercise of political rights required a clear and conscious
attachment to and familiarity with republican principles.”); see also id. at 219
(describing how time in the United States was thought to ensure “that those imbued
with ‘foreign principles’ had the opportunity to assimilate the habits, values, and
modes of thought necessary for responsible participation in a virtuous, self-governing
republican community.”); see also id. at 237 (quoting Thomas Hartley of
Pennsylvania during the congressional debates in 1790 as stating that residency
requirements were necessary for immigrants to develop “a firm attachment to
government” and noting Michael Stone of Maryland’s argument for a residence term
“long enough to guarantee ‘first, that he should have an opportunity of knowing the
circumstances of our Government, and in consequence thereof, shall have admitted
the truth of the principles we hold. Second, that he shall have acquired a taste for
this kind of Government.”).
38. 1790 Naturalization Act ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (1790) (repealed 1795).
39. Id.
40. See 1870 Naturalization Act, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870).
41. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
42. NGAI, supra note 4, at 8.
43. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5121 (1870); see also Banks, supra
note 4, at 11.
44. See Banks, supra note 4, at 11–16 (discussing the proffered and actual
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The legislative history for the 1870 Naturalization Act reveals
significant misgivings within Congress about Chinese immigrants’
values, norms, and practices, and their ability to adapt to
mainstream America.45 Concerns about an inability to assimilate
led Congress to revise the naturalization law in a way that
reinforced the permanent foreignness of Asian immigrants through
the Chinese Exclusion Act.46 This act is generally known for
prohibiting Chinese laborers from entering the United States. The
Act also stated: “hereafter no State court or court of the United
States shall admit Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict
with this act are hereby repealed.”47 Despite the federal
naturalization law limiting naturalization to noncitizens who were
“free white person[s]” and those of “African nativity and African
descent,” Congress doubled down on the permanent foreignness of
Asian immigrants.48
B. Naturalization Case Law
The 1790 Naturalization Act, the 1870 Naturalization Act, and
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 each utilized categorical
eligibility criteria—specifically race.49 Asian immigrants were
ineligible because they were not White. Yet it took a series of court
cases to confirm that Chinese, Japanese, and Indian immigrants
were not White and to explain why. As documented in Ian F. Haney
López’ 1996 classic, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE, courts adopted two main strategies for determining whether
reasons for denying Asian immigrants citizenship in the 1870 Naturalization Act);
1870 Naturalization Act, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870) (“And it be further
enacted, That the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of African
nativity and to persons of African descent.”).
45. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 239–240; NGAI,
supra note 4, at 8.
46. See NGAI, supra note 4, at 8; see also Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126,
§ 14, 22 Stat. 58, 61(repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat.
163 (1952)); see also Sohoni & Vafa, supra note 8, at 124–25 (discussing how the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and other naturalization laws “reinforced the notion
of Asians as intrinsically foreign.”).
47. Chinese Exclusion Act §14, 22 Stat. 58, 61.
48. See Banks, supra note 4, at 11–14 (describing how many senators did not
believe that Chinese immigrants could assimilate while “there was overwhelming
support for black immigrants to have access to naturalization.”).
49. See 1790 Naturalization Act ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (1790) (repealed 1795)
(“Be it enacted . . . That any alien, being a free white person . . . may be admitted to
become a citizen thereof.”); 1870 Naturalization Act, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256
(1870) (“And be it further enacted, That the naturalization laws are hereby extended
to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”); §14, 22 Stat. 58, 61
(“That hereafter no State court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to
citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.”).
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an individual was a “white person” as the phrase was used in the
naturalization statutes.50 In the first approach, courts relied on
scientific conceptions of racial classifications and concluded that
those deemed Caucasian were “white persons.”51 The second
approach relied on popular conceptions of Whiteness rather than
the scientific classifications of Caucasian or Mongolian.52
In 1878 the Circuit Court for the District of California was the
first court to hold that Chinese immigrants were not White and
were thus ineligible to naturalize.53 The court described petitioner
Ah Yup as “a native and citizen of the empire of China, of the
Mongolian race” and stated that the issue before the court was
“whether the statute authorizes the naturalization of a native of
China of the Mongolian race.”54 The court held that it did not and
initially justified its decision based on popular conceptions of
Whiteness. The court explained that:
[T]hese words in this country, at least, have undoubtedly
acquired a well settled meaning in common popular speech, and
they are constantly used in the sense so acquired in the
literature of the country, as well as in common parlance. As
ordinarily used everywhere in the United States, one would
scarcely fail to understand that the party employing the words
‘white person’ would intend a person of the Caucasian race.55

The court’s analysis then used the scientific approach to
confirm the idea that an Asian individual could not be White. The
court referred to racial classifications as defined in Webster’s
dictionary,
which
referenced
Blumenbach’s
race-based

50. The case law focuses on defining Whiteness because only one of the 52 racial
prerequisite cases litigated between 1878 and 1952 raised a claim that an individual
was eligible based on being of “African nativity or African descent.” See, e.g. In re
Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding that Benedito Cruz could not be
naturalized even though his “mother is half African and half Indian and [his] father
is a full blooded Indian” because if Cruz were “of one-quarter white blood and threequarters Indian, he could not be admitted to citizenship as a white person . . . . It
would therefore seem entirely incongruous to reason that the words ‘African descent’
should be construed to be less exacting in denoting eligibility for naturalization, than
the term ‘white persons.’”).
51. IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1996).
52. See Thind, 261 U.S. at 208–09 (“It is in the popular sense of the word,
therefore, that we employ it as an aid to the construction of the statute, for it would
be obviously illogical to convert words of common speech used in a statute into words
of scientific terminology when neither the latter nor the science for whose purposes
they were coined was within the contemplation of the framers of the statute or of the
people for whom it was framed.”).
53. In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223, 224–25 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878).
54. Id. at 223.
55. Id.
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classification system, and noted that “no one includes the white, or
Caucasian, with the Mongolian or yellow race.”56
Congress reinforced the court’s decision with the Chinese
Exclusion Act in 1882.57 Yet the status of Japanese immigrants and
Indian immigrants was still an open question. The Supreme Court
held that neither group of immigrants were eligible for
naturalization in 1923 and 1924 respectively. Through Ozawa v.
United States and United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, the United
States Supreme Court solidified the permanent foreignness of
Asian immigrants by holding that neither science nor common
sense allowed Asian immigrants to be White.58 Whiteness within
United States naturalization law was used as a proxy for identifying
immigrants who had the capacity to adopt mainstream American
values, norms, and practices.59 Consequently, the holdings in
Ozawa and Thind reaffirmed that Asian immigrants would be
permanently foreign because they would remain ineligible for
citizenship despite their individual characteristics.
i.

Ozawa

In Ozawa v. United States, the Supreme Court was faced with
deciding whether Japanese immigrants were eligible to naturalize
based on being White.60 The Court focused on a scientific approach
to Whiteness and rejected the idea that individual evidence of
assimilation could be sufficient.61 This approach to viewing race as
a fixed category rather than as a proxy for values, norms, and
practices was reinforced in Thind and Toyota v. United States.
Takao Ozawa came to the United States in 1894 as a child and
resided in California.62 He was educated at the University of

56. Id. at 224. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach was a German social scientist who
introduced a race-based classification system for humans. Raj Bhopal et al., The
Beautiful Skull and Blumenbach’s Errors: the Birth of the Scientific Concept of Race,
335 B.M.J. 1308 (2007).
57. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58, 61 (repealed by
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
58. See Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 198 (“the appellant . . . is clearly of a race which is
not Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone on the negative side.
A large number of the federal and state courts have so decided and we find no
reported case definitely to the contrary. These decisions are sustained by numerous
scientific authorities, which we do not deem it necessary to review.”); see also Thind,
261 U.S. at 208–09.
59. See Banks, supra note 4, at 81 (discussing how “culture is used to evaluate
immigrant groups.”).
60. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 189–190.
61. Id. at 198.
62. Id. at 189.
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California, Berkeley and settled in Hawaii in 1914.63 On October 16,
1914, Ozawa submitted an application for naturalization to the
United States District Court for the Territory of Hawaii.64 The
United States District Attorney for the District of Hawaii opposed
Ozawa’s petition because Ozawa was not a “white person,” but
appears to have conceded that Ozawa “was well qualified by
character and education for citizenship.”65
There could be no doubt that Ozawa had adopted and was
committed to mainstream American values, norms, and practices.
In his brief before the district court, Ozawa explained, “In name,
General Benedict Arnold was an American, but at heart he was a
traitor. In name, I am not an American, but at heart I am a true
American.”66 He then went on to detail evidence of his assimilation:
(1) I did not report my name, my marriage, or the names of my
children to the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu;
notwithstanding all Japanese subjects are requested to do so.
These matters were reported to the American government. (2)
I do not have any connection with any Japanese churches or
schools, or any Japanese organizations here or elsewhere. (3) I
am sending my children to an American church and American
school in place of a Japanese one. (4) Most of the time I use the
American (English) language at home, so that my children
cannot speak the Japanese language. (5) I educated myself in
American schools for nearly eleven years by supporting myself.
(6) I have lived continuously within the United States for over
twenty-eight years. (7) I chose as my wife one educated in
American schools . . . instead of one educated in Japan. (8) I
have steadily prepared to return the kindness which our Uncle
Sam has extended me . . . so it is my honest hope to do
something good to the United States before I bid a farewell to
this world.67

The Supreme Court did not doubt any of this but noted that it
was required to give effect to Congress’ intent.68 Congress intended
that only “white persons” and individuals of “African nativity and
descent” were eligible to naturalize.69 The Court focused its analysis
on determining how to define Whiteness.
63. LÓPEZ, supra note 51, at 56.
64. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 189.
65. Id.
66. LÓPEZ, supra note 51, at 80 (citing Ichioka, supra note 1, at 11).
67. Id. at 80 (citing Ichioka, supra note 1, at 11).
68. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 194.
69. See Amendments to the Naturalization Laws: Hearing on H.R. 10694 Before
the H. Comm. On Immigration & Naturalization, 65th Cong. 9–10 (1918) (statement
of Raymond Crist, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Naturalization). But see Salyer,
supra note 4, at 859–861 (discussing how Crist intentionally minimized the bill’s
scope in his representations to Congress, and in fact remained an ardent advocate
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The Court stated that the language creating the racial
requirements in the naturalization law “import a racial and not an
individual test.”70 The Court rejected using color as a basis for
ascertaining Whiteness because it would be impracticable, “as that
differs greatly among persons of the same race, even among AngloSaxons.”71 Consequently, “to adopt the color test alone would result
in a confused overlapping of races and a gradual merging of one into
the other, without any practical line of separation.”72 The Court
similarly concluded that information about Ozawa’s actual
assimilation was irrelevant. The opinion noted that “[t]he briefs
filed on behalf of appellant refer in complimentary terms to the
culture and enlightenment of the Japanese people, and with this
estimate we have no reason to disagree; but these are matters which
cannot enter into our consideration of the questions here at issue.”73
The only matter for the Court to decide is “the will of Congress.”74
There is no implication in the naturalization law or the Court’s
opinion of “any suggestion of individual unworthiness or racial
inferiority. These considerations are in no manner involved.”75
Rather the Court is simply attempting to ascertain what Congress
meant when it used the term “white persons,” and decided it meant
Caucasian.76
The Court acknowledged that the category Caucasian did not
create “a sharp line of demarcation between those who are entitled
and those who are not entitled to naturalization, but rather a zone
of more or less debatable ground outside of which, upon the one
hand, are those clearly eligible, and outside of which, upon the other
hand, are those clearly ineligible for citizenship.”77 While the Court
concluded that Ozawa was clearly not Caucasian, the Court would
later struggle with what to do when scientific authorities and
common understandings of Whiteness contradict each other.

for the naturalization of Asian veterans).
70. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 197.
71. Id. (explaining that there were “imperceptible gradations from the fair blond
to the swarthy brunette, the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued
persons of the brown or yellow races.”).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 198.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 197.
77. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 198.
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ii. Thind
On July 4, 1913, Bhagat Singh Thind arrived in the United
States as a twenty-one year old graduate of Punjab University.78
After his arrival in the United States, he served in the United
States Army for six months at Camp Lewis.79 He obtained the rank
of acting sergeant and was granted an honorable discharge.80 Seven
years later, Thind became a United States citizen when Judge
Wolverton, of the District Court of the United States for the District
of Oregon granted him a certificate of naturalization.81 Thind had
argued that he was eligible to naturalize because Indians from
India were Caucasian and therefore, he was a White person eligible
to naturalize.82 Judge Wolverton was not alone in concluding that
individuals from India were Caucasian and therefore White.83 In
fact, his decision was based on precedent. He cited three cases with
similar conclusions and explained that he “was content to rest [his]
decision . . . upon a line of cases which . . . are illustrative.”84 He
noted that there were contrary decisions, but he explained that he
was “impressed that they [were] not in line with the greater weight
of authority.”85
The United States moved to cancel Thind’s certificate of
naturalization, claiming that he was not a White person and
therefore was not “lawfully entitled to naturalization.”86 The
government lost at the district court and the appellate court
certified the question of eligibility to the United States Supreme
Court.87 The Supreme Court agreed with the government and held
that a “high caste Hindu of full Indian blood, born at Amrit Sar,
Punjab, India” is not a White person, and is therefore not eligible to
naturalize.88
In Thind, Justice Sutherland (who had also written Ozawa)
rejected equating Caucasian and White. Justice Sutherland
explained that, “‘Caucasian’ is a conventional word of much
78. LÓPEZ, supra note 51, at 61.
79. In re Bhagat Singh Thind, 268 F. 683, 684 (D. Or. 1920).
80. Id. at 684.
81. See id. at 686.
82. LÓPEZ, supra note 51, at 61.
83. See Singh, 257 Fed. at 209; see also United States v. Balsara, 180 Fed. 694
(2d Cir. 1910); see also In re Halladjian, 174 Fed. 834 (D. Mass. 1909).
84. Thind, 268 F. at 684 (citing Singh, 257 Fed. at 209; see also Balsara, 180 Fed.
at 694; Halladjian, 174 Fed. at 834).
85. Thind, 268 F. at 684.
86. Thind, 261 U.S. at 207.
87. Id. at 206.
88. Id. at 206, 215.
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flexibility, as a study of the literature dealing with racial questions
will disclose, and while it and the words ‘white persons’ are treated
as synonymous for the purposes of that case, they are not of
identical meaning—idem per idem.”89 The Court applied a “common
man” understanding to the phrase “white persons.”90 Based on a
common understanding of Whiteness, the Court concluded that “[i]t
is a matter of familiar observation and knowledge that the physical
group characteristics of the Hindus render them readily
distinguishable from the various groups of persons in this country
commonly recognized as White.”91 Consequently, individuals from
India were not White persons and were thus not eligible to
naturalize. 92
As in Ozawa, the Thind Court rejected an individualized
approach to measuring Whiteness. The Thind Court suggested that
the white person requirement is a proxy for assimilation. Justice
Sutherland explained that:
[t]he children of English, French, German, Italian,
Scandinavian, and other European parentage, quickly merge
into the mass of our population and lose the distinctive
hallmarks of their European origin. On the other hand, it
cannot be doubted that the children born in this country of
Hindu parents would retain indefinitely the clear evidence of
their ancestry.93

The Court went on to explain that this was not “to suggest the
slightest question of racial superiority or inferiority. What we
suggest is merely racial difference, and it was of such character and
extent that the great body of our people instinctively recognize it
and reject the thought of assimilation.”94 Despite the Court’s
concession that there was no question regarding Thind’s “individual
89. Id. at 208 (“In the endeavor to ascertain the meaning of the statute we must
not fail to keep in mind that it does not employ the word “Caucasian,” but the words
“white persons,” and these are words of common speech and not of scientific origin.
The word “Caucasian,” not only was employed in the law, but was probably wholly
unfamiliar to the original framers of the statute in 1790.”).
90. Thind, 261 U.S. at 214 (“What we now hold is that the words ‘free white
persons’ are words of common speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the
understanding of the common man, synonymous with the word ‘Caucasian’ only as
that word is popularly understood.”). Compare id. at 208 (“we held that the words
imported a racial and not an individual test and were meant to indicate only persons
of what is popularly known as the Caucasian race.”) (emphasis in original), with
Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 198 (describing that Caucasian was not “a sharp line of
demarcation between those who are entitled and those who are not entitled to
naturalization, but rather a zone of more or less debatable ground.”).
91. Thind, 261 U.S. at 215.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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qualifications,” there was no escaping that he belonged to a group
that Congress had deemed unassimilable.95
The Court’s opinions in Ozawa and Thind clarified that, based
on scientific classifications and common knowledge, Asian
immigrants were not White and were thus ineligible to naturalize.
These decisions suggested that the individual characteristics of
Asian immigrants were irrelevant for eligibility. Congress dictated
that only White persons and persons of African nativity and descent
were eligible to naturalize.96 Consequently, the Court’s role was
limited to interpreting the term “white person.”
By 1923, it was clear that United States naturalization
decisions would not be made based on individualized assessments
of loyalty and language skills.97 Such an assessment would only be
available to individuals who fell within certain racial categories.98
Congress and the courts concluded that being within the category
of Asian provided sufficiently accurate and reliable information
about an individual’s values, norms, and practices to make an
individualized assessment unnecessary.
II. Military Naturalization
Another category that Congress viewed as useful for
naturalization purposes was membership in the United States
Armed Forces.99 While such membership did not provide automatic
access to naturalization, certain assumptions about the time
necessary to develop loyalty and adopt key mainstream American
values, norms, and practices were relaxed.
A. Fast-Track Naturalization for Servicepersons & Veterans
Military service has not only been viewed as a “duty and right
of citizenship,” but also as a way for noncitizens to prove “their
worth for citizenship.”100 Congress first provided a naturalization

95. Id. at 207.
96. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 190 (quoting Section 2169).
97. Thind, 261 U.S. at 207 (“The children of English, French, German, Italian,
Scandinavian, and other European parentage, quickly merge into the mass of our
population and lose the distinctive hallmarks of their European origin.”); Ozawa, 260
U.S. at 190 (describing Asian individuals as “having manners, customs and language
which seemed strange, and unwilling to mingle with western people”).
98. Cf. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 192 (holding only those who are deemed to be “free
white persons” are eligible for naturalization).
99. See Milita Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 594, 597 (1862) (eliminating certain time and
residency requirements for applicants who serve in the United States Armed Forces).
100. Sohoni & Vafa, supra note 8, at 125.
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any alien, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who has
enlisted or shall enlist in the armies of the United
States . . . and has been or shall be hereafter honorably
discharged, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United
States . . . and that he shall not be required to prove more than
one year’s residence within the United States previous to his
application to become such citizen.102

Since 1862, Congress has continuously provided a fast track to
naturalization for servicepersons.103 Congress has viewed
noncitizens willing to serve voluntarily in the United States Armed
Forces as individuals who have “demonstrated the necessary
qualities for national membership.”104 Military naturalization is
also viewed as a reward to noncitizens who have been willing to
sacrifice their lives for the United States. The court in In re Charr
explained that the purpose of military naturalization provisions is:
to reward those aliens who had entered the military or naval
service of the United States, as therein described, by admitting
them to
citizenship
without
many
of
the
slow
processes, formalities, and strictness of proofs which were
rigidly provided and enforced under the law affecting
naturalization as it existed then, and as it exists now.105

Military naturalization provisions eliminate or alter some of
the substantive and procedural naturalization requirements. For
example, the Militia Act of July 17, 1862 and the Act of June 30,
1914 allowed servicepersons to naturalize without a declaration of
intention.106 Pursuant to then-existing law, individuals could not
naturalize unless they had filed a declaration of intention to become
a citizen three years prior to seeking naturalization.107 The military
naturalization provisions eliminating the need for a declaration of
intention allowed individuals to avoid the three-year wait before
becoming citizens.108 Those provisions also occasionally shortened
101. Id. at 120.
102. The Militia Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 594, 597 (1862). The standard residence
requirement was five years. Naturalization Law of 1802, 2 Stat. 153, § 1 (1802).
103. Cf. Sohoni & Vafa, supra note 8 (tracking the history of military
naturalization for non-citizen Asian veterans).
104. Id. at 126.
105. In re Charr, 273 F. at 210–11
106. 63 Cong. Ch. 130, June 30, 1914, 38 Stat. 392, 395; Militia Act, 12 Stat. 594,
§ 21.
107. 1906 Naturalization Act, Pub. L. No. 59-338, ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596, 596–99
(1906); Naturalization Law of 1802, 2 Stat. 153, § 1 (1802).
108. Cf. 38 Stat. 392, 395 (allowing applicants to forego “proof of residence on
shore.”); 12 Stat. 594, § 21 (“[H]e shall not be required to prove more than one year’s
residence within the United States previous to his application to become such
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the length of time that one had to reside in the United States. For
example, the Act of July 17, 1862 only required one year of residence
and the Act of July 19, 1919 did not have a residency
requirement.109 At the time that both of these provisions were
enacted, the general naturalization laws required five years of
residency.110 Citizenship scholars and historians have noted that
residence periods have been a feature of United States
naturalization law as an “‘apprenticeship’ to allow the individual
immigrant to become firmly attached to the well-being of the
Republic.”111 Sufficient residence was viewed as ensuring that
future citizens were loyal, which was a key quality to “community
security.”112 Shorter residence periods were justified for
servicepersons and veterans because “[m]ilitary service was seen as
more than adequately demonstrating these normative qualities.”113
Hundreds of Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans
voluntarily served in the United States Armed Forces during World
War I.114 They served out of a sense of duty to the country they
viewed as their own, and many hoped that the presumptions about
military service and cultural assimilation would extend to them.
B. Asian Immigrant Military Service
In need of “quickly raising and training a modern national
army with the capability of fighting abroad,” the United States
government has frequently targeted immigrants for military
recruitment.115 Asian immigrants responded to these recruitment
efforts during World War I and approximately one thousand Asian
immigrants volunteered for military service.116 Due to the
prohibition on Asian immigrant naturalization, judges and
administrative officials were faced with determining whether the
general prohibition against non-White and non-Black immigrant
naturalization applied to the military naturalization provisions.

citizen.”).
109. Act of July 19, 1919, ch. 24, 41 Stat 222; Militia Act, 12 Stat. 594, § 21.
110. 1906 Naturalization Act, 34 Stat. 596, 596–98; Naturalization Law of 1802,
2 Stat. 153, § 1.
111. KETTNER, supra note 8, at 243.
112. Id. at 10.
113. Sohoni & Vafa, supra note 8, at 126.
114. See Salyer, supra note 4, at 854 (detailing how many Asian immigrants were
eligible for the draft in 1917).
115. Id. at 851.
116. Id.; Harry Maxwell Naka, The Naturalization of Japanese War Veterans of
the World War Forces 40 (1939) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California).
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Most judges concluded that the statutory language was clear—
it either prohibited Asian immigrant naturalization or it had no
racial requirements.117 The congressional intent analysis that
judges and administrative officials conducted reflected strong
disagreement about how Congress viewed military service and
other naturalization criteria vis-à-vis race as a tool for measuring
citizenship eligibility.118 The judges that naturalized at least 500
Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans between 1918 and
1925 concluded that Congress viewed the specific practice of
military service as a better measure of assimilation than race.119
Yet the Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota v. United States
reinforced the idea that Congress concluded that race was a better
indication of cultural compatibility despite specific evidence of
mainstream American cultural practices.120
III. Measuring American Values, Norms, & Practices
With the enactment of the 1918 Naturalization Act, immigrant
members of the United States Armed Forces and veterans had a
clear and uniform fast track to citizenship. As noted in Part II, this
fast track was partially based on the idea that military service was
an excellent proxy for loyalty and the other characteristics deemed
desirable for United States citizenship. Asian immigrant
servicepersons and veterans sought to take advantage of these new
naturalization provisions because they appeared to eliminate the
racial requirements.121 This Part analyzes the various strategies
that Bureau of Naturalization officials and state and federal judges
used to interpret the 1918 Naturalization Act. All officials and
judges began by attempting to determine the plain meaning of the
statutory text, but some found the text ambiguous.122 Approaches
to determining congressional intent varied. Some decision makers
focused on the history of congressional action in the area of
naturalization while others attempted to ascertain the normative
117. Compare In re Charr, 273 F. at 214 (“The words ‘any person of foreign birth’
occurring in the Act of July 19, supra, do not enlarge the word ‘alien’ as contemplated
by these acts.”) with Thind, 268 F. at 685 (“I see no analogy in this act to the Chinese
Exclusion Act.”).
118. Sohoni & Vafa, supra note 8, at 142–44 (tracking the history of judicial
interpretation of Congressional intent).
119. JAPANESE AM. NAT’L MUSEUM, supra note 2, at 46.
120. Salyer, supra note 4, at 865.
121. Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r Raymond F. Crist to Comm’n Richard K.
Campbell 1 (Jan. 22, 1919) (on file with the Naturalization Administrative Files);
Japanese in Army Entitled to Citizenship, supra note 3. This textual reading is
addressed further in Section III.A.ii.a.
122. See, e.g., In re Charr, 273 F. at 210–12 (discussing the ambiguity of the Act)
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goals of the military naturalization provisions and extrapolate from
there. In Toyota v. United States, the Court used the former
approach to conclude that Congress intended for the racial
requirements to apply to the military naturalization provisions.123
The Court’s holding reinforced the use of race as a categorical
eligibility requirement, which foreclosed the possibility that Asian
immigrants would have the opportunity to demonstrate their
individual worthiness of United States citizenship.
A. 1918 Naturalization Act
In 1918, Congress revised the 1906 Naturalization Act to
harmonize the naturalization rules for immigrants serving in
different branches of the United States Armed Forces.124 To
facilitate this goal, the seventh subdivision was proposed as an
addition to the 1906 Naturalization Act. The seventh subdivision
provided a legal basis for the naturalization of noncitizens who had
served in the various branches of the United States Armed
Forces.125 Noncitizens who served in one of the specified capacities
were not required to file a declaration of intention to become a
citizen or to prove five years of residence within the United
States.126
The seventh subdivision did not include any racial
requirements.127 Rather, the 1918 Naturalization Act included the
123. See Toyota, 268 U.S. at 412 (holding the Congressional intent “was not to
enlarge § 2169”).
124. Amendments to the Naturalization Laws: Hearing on H.R. 10694 Before the
H. Comm. on Immigration & Naturalization, 65th Cong. 3-4 (1918) (explaining the
purpose of the revisions was to provide “for the uniform naturalization of nearly all
of the men in the United Sates service, including those in the service of our Army
and Navy.”); id. at 4 (explaining Deputy Commissioner of Naturalization Raymond
F. Crist’s view that the substantive revisions to the seventh subdivision would “unify
the exemptions that are extended to various classes, such as aliens who have served
in the Army and have been honorably discharged, in the Navy, in the Marine Corps,
in the merchant marine, and in the Revenue-Cutter Service.”); id. (detailing how Mr.
Crist’s view that without the revisions there was no legal provision that allowed the
Government to “avail itself of the military experience of men who have served in the
National Guard, who served in the Coast Guard, and who have served on board the
vessels of the United States Government, such as the Army transports.”).
125. Naturalization Act of 1918, Ch. 69, § 7, 40 Stat. 542, 542 (The statute applied
to noncitizens who had served in “the armies of the United States, either the Regular
or the Volunteer Forces, or the National Army, the National Guard or Naval Militia
of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or the State militia in Federal
service, or in the United States Navy or Marine Corps, or in the United States Coast
Guard, or who has served for three years on board of any vessel of the United States
Government, or for three years on board of merchant or fishing vessels of the United
States of more than twenty tons burden . . . .”).
126. Id.
127. See id. at 542 (opening military naturalization to “any alien”).
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following language: “nothing in this Act shall repeal or in any way
enlarge section twenty-one hundred and sixty-nine of the Revised
Statutes, except as specified in the seventh subdivision of this Act
and under the limitation therein defined.”128 This was often referred
to as a limited repeal of section 2169,129 which had limited the
naturalization provisions to “aliens being free white persons, and to
aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”130
When courts and the Bureau of Naturalization were faced with
naturalization applications from Asian immigrant servicepersons
and veterans, they were confronted with a challenging statutory
interpretation question. The seventh subdivision not only used the
term “any alien,” it also specifically provided for the naturalization
of “[a]ny native-born Filipino” and “any Porto Rican not a citizen of
the United States.”131 Bureau of Naturalization Commissioner
Richard K. Campbell and a number of judges interpreted the repeal
of section 2169 as only applying to Filipino and Puerto Rican
noncitizens.132 They did not interpret the section 2169 limited
repeal as applying to the language “any alien” within the seventh
subdivision.133 The seventh subdivision in relevant part stated:
Any native-born Filipino of the age of twenty-one years and
upward who has declared his intention to become a citizen of
the United States and who has enlisted or may hereafter enlist
in [specified military service] . . . ; or any alien, or any Porto
Rican not a citizen of the United States, of the age of twentyone years and upward who has enlisted or may hereafter enlist
in or enter [specified military service] . . . may, on presentation
of the required declaration of intention petition for
naturalization without proof of the required five
years’ residence within the United States if upon examination
by the representative of the Bureau of Naturalization, in
accordance with the requirements of this subdivision it is
shown that such residence can not be established; any alien
serving in the military or naval service of the United States
during the time this country is engaged in the present war may
file his petition for naturalization without proof of the required
five years’ residence within the United States . . . .134

128. Id. at 547
129. Id.
130. In re Knight, 171 F. 299, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1909) (quoting Act of Feb. 18, 1875,
ch. 80, 18 Stat. 318).
131. Naturalization Act of 1918, ch. 69, § 7, 40 Stat. 542, 542.
132. Memorandum from Comm’r Richard K. Campbell 3 (Apr. 2, 1919) (on file in
Naturalization Administrative Files) (citing legal opinions in his decision restricting
the seventh subdivisions impact).
133. Id. at 3.
134. 40 Stat. 542, 542 (emphasis added).
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Other naturalization decision makers like Judge Horace W.
Vaughan of the United States District Court for Hawaii and Bureau
of Naturalization Deputy Commissioner Raymond Crist concluded
that the limited repeal of section 2169 applied to the term “any
alien” as it appeared within the seventh subdivision.135 Their
conclusions often turned on how they believed Congress viewed
Asian immigrants.136
Judges and administrative officials can only naturalize
individuals who satisfy the criteria established by Congress. Was
the military service provided by these immigrants sufficient
evidence of their commitment to and adoption of mainstream
American values, norms, and practices? Or did their race and
ethnicity create a presumption of unassimilability that could not be
overcome? If Congress answered yes to the first question, then the
limited repeal of section 2169 should be read as applying to the term
“any alien” appearing in the seventh subdivision. However, if
Congress answered yes to the second question, then the repeal of
section 2169 would be limited to Filipino and Puerto Rican
servicepersons and veterans.
Administrative officials and judges analyzed the relevant
precedent, statutory text, and congressional intent to interpret the
meaning of the seventh subdivision. While this section examines
each of these bases for decision as separate and distinct, judges and
administrative officials rarely treated them as independent silos.
Text was often interpreted in light of congressional intention and
precedent was viewed as valuable based on its congruence with
congressional intent.137 Yet independently analyzing the text,
precedent, and congressional intent clarifies the framework for
deciding whether Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans
were eligible to naturalize.
After approximately eight years of judges and administrative
officials debating this issue, the Bureau of Naturalization and the
Department of Justice filed a test case to get a definitive answer.138

135. See Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist
to Comm’r Richard K. Campbell, supra note 3; see also Japanese in Army Entitled to
Citizenship, supra note 3.
136. See Japanese in Army Entitled to Citizenship, supra note 3 (“It is evident
from the seventh subdivision that Congress did not intend to exclude any race from
naturalization when it passed the law.”).
137. See, e.g., Toyota, 268 U.S. at 412. (“The legislative history of the act indicates
that the intention of Congress was not to enlarge § 2169, except in respect of Filipinos
qualified by the specified service.”) (emphasis added).
138. Memorandum from Sec’y of Labor Wilson to Comm’r of Naturalization 3 (Feb.
7, 1921) (on file with the Naturalization Administrative Files).
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On May 25, 1925, the Supreme Court decided Toyota v. United
States and held that Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans
were not eligible to naturalize pursuant to the 1918 Naturalization
Act.139 The Court concluded that the limited repeal of section 2169
only applied to Filipinos.140 This holding was based in large part on
the Court’s conclusion that “it has long been the national policy to
maintain the distinction of color and race, radical change is not
lightly to be deemed to have been intended.”141
i.

Precedent

Between 1918 and 1925, courts and administrative officials
did not have the benefit of a Supreme Court decision interpreting
the 1918 Naturalization Act. Yet relevant precedent existed due to
Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans seeking to naturalize
pursuant to prior military naturalization fast track statutes.142 At
the time each of the five fast-track statutes was enacted, section
2169 was a part of the naturalization law.143 It limited the
naturalization provisions to “aliens being free white persons, and to
aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”144 The
military naturalization provisions made no mention of race, and
Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans sought to naturalize
pursuant to these provisions.145 Between 1862 and 1918, there were
four published cases in which Asian immigrant servicepersons and
veterans sought to naturalize pursuant to the military
naturalization fast track.146 In each of these cases, the petitioners
had the required military service, but the court was faced with
determining whether or not section 2169 applied to the military
naturalization provisions.147 In each of these cases, the courts held
that section 2169 applied to the military naturalization provisions

139. See Toyota, 268 U.S. 402.
140. Id. at 412.
141. Id.
142. In re Alverto, 198 F. 688 (E.D. Pa. 1912); Bessho v. United States, 178 F. 245
(4th Cir. 1910); In re Knight, 171 F. 299 (E.D.N.Y. 1909); In re Buntaro Kumagai,
163 F. 922 (W.D. Wash. 1908).
143. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 316, 318 (amending Section
2169 to include the words “being free white persons”).
144. In re Knight, 171 F. 299, 300.
145. Act of May 9, 1918, 40 Stat. 542, 542 (opening military naturalization to “any
alien”).
146. In re Alverto, 198 F. 688; Bessho, 178 F. 245; In re Knight, 171 F. at 299; In
re Buntaro Kumagai, 163 F. at 922.
147. One case was brought pursuant to the Act of July 17, 1862 and the other
three cases were based on the Act of July 26, 1894.
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and thus the Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans were
ineligible to naturalize.148
ii. Textual Analysis
Administrative officials and judges read the text of the 1918
Naturalization Act to reach one of three conclusions. Either (1) the
text made Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans eligible to
naturalize, (2) Filipinos and Puerto Ricans were the only non-White
and non-Black immigrant servicepersons eligible to naturalize, or
(3) the text was ambiguous and did not clearly answer the question
of eligibility.149 Much of the information available about judicial
decision making on this question is administrative memoranda in
which naturalization officials report on the decisions of judges
around the country. The most detailed textual analyses came from
Commissioner Campbell and Deputy Commissioner Crist. In
internal memoranda these two administrative officials present
detailed arguments for their respective positions based on the text
of the statute.150 Such analysis from judges is rare because there
are so few written opinions available, though Judge Vaughan of
Hawaii did perform a detailed textual analysis.151
a. Asian Immigrant Servicepersons & Veterans Eligible
Deputy Commissioner Raymond F. Crist read the 1918
Naturalization Act as making Asian immigrant servicepersons and
veterans eligible to naturalize. When the debate initially arose he
stated, “[t]he language seems to me to be perfectly clear.”152 He
argued that the limited repeal of section 2169 was to be construed
as applying to the phrase “any alien” appearing in the seventh
subdivision.153 In a memo to Commissioner Campbell, he explained
that:
[the] question presented is whether the words “any alien
serving in the military or naval service of the United States
during the time this country is engaged in the present war,”
when read in conjunction with the language of section 2 of the
148. In re Alverto, 198 F. at 691; Bessho, 178 F. at 245, 248; In re Knight, 171 F.
at 301; Kumagai, 163 F. at 924.
149. See In re Charr, 273 F. at 210–11; In re Alverto, 198 F. at 690; Japanese in
Amy Entitled to Citizenship, supra note 3.
150. Memorandum from Comm’r Richard K. Campbell 3, supra note 132 (Apr. 2,
1919); Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist to
Comm’r Richard K. Campbell, supra note 3.
151. Japanese in Army Entitled to Citizenship, supra note 3.
152. Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist to
Comm’r Richard K. Campbell, supra note 3.
153. Id.
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same act constitute an exception from the general provisions of
section 2169, which admits of the naturalization of aliens,
during military or naval service of the United States during the
present war, who are not white persons or aliens of African
nativity or persons of African descent.154

Deputy Commissioner Crist explained that the text “clearly
showed that [Congress’] intention was to remove section 2169 of the
Revised Statutes from consideration in the naturalization of any
alien embraced within subdivision 7th.”155 He went on to note that
“[t]his subdivision is an exempting subdivision. It is the subdivision
where all of the differing exemptions have been brought together
and there unified.”156 He emphasized the relationship between the
use of the phrase “any alien” and the limited repeal of section 2169,
and concluded the seventh subdivision made all immigrant
servicepersons and veterans eligible for naturalization by using the
language “any alien.” While section 2169 generally modified that
terminology throughout the naturalization statutory provisions,
Deputy Commissioner Crist argued that it did not in this case. The
1918 Naturalization Act specifically stated that it did not repeal or
enlarge any part of 2169, except as specified in the seventh
subdivision.157
Judge Vaughan read the text similarly. Before he began
hearing naturalization petitions from Asian immigrant
servicepersons and veterans, Honolulu’s Star Bulletin newspaper
reported that he believed “this act of May 9, 1918, is an amendment
to naturalization laws and repeals section 2169.”158 He is reported
to have explained that “[i]t is evident from the seventh subdivision
that Congress did not intend to exclude any race from
naturalization when it passed the law, otherwise, . . . a clause
would have been inserted dealing separately with those that
exclusion was intended for.”159 The Star Bulletin concluded, “the
words ‘any alien’ are taken literally by the judge.”160 Judge
Vaughan followed this interpretation in the case In re Leon
Feronda.161 He explained:
154. Id. at 1–2.
155. Id. at 4.
156. Id.
157. Naturalization Act of 1918, ch. 69, § 7, 40 Stat. 542, 547 (stating that “nothing
in this Act shall repeal or in any way enlarge section twenty-one hundred and sixtynine of the Revised Statutes, except as specified in the seventh subdivision of this
Act and under the limitation therein defined.”).
158. Japanese in Army Entitled to Citizenship, supra note 3.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. In re Leon Feronda 5 (D. Haw. Jan. 24, 1919) (on file with Naturalization
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The seventh subdivision does not mention section 2169, but it
does authorize the doing of some things that are inconsistent
with said section. Considering this fact and the peculiar
language of this repealing clause, it appears to me that Congress
intended to make section 2169 inapplicable to cases coming
within the specification of the seventh subdivision. If this is not
what the language means I am unable to see what it does
mean.162

Three months later, he offered additional analysis regarding
the relationship between the limited repeal of section 2169 and the
seventh subdivision.163 Judge Vaughan explained that Congress
had passed various statutes providing for the naturalization of
servicepersons and veterans.164 He noted that “in every instance in
which the question has been before the courts, it has been held that
section 2169 limited every provision of every such act.”165
Based on the text, Judge Vaughan concluded section 2169 was
“repealed or enlarged as specified in the seventh subdivision,” and
that meant that “the provisions of the seventh subdivision [were
taken] out of the operation of section 2169.”166 Judge Vaughan
single handedly naturalized a large portion of the Asian immigrant
servicepersons and veterans who became United States citizens
between 1918 and 1925. It is estimated that he naturalized 398
Japanese immigrant servicepersons, 99 Korean immigrant
servicepersons, and four Chinese immigrant servicepersons.167
A number of judges shared this textual reading, including
Judge Trippet of the United States Federal Court for the District of
Los Angeles, Judge Hollenbeck, state court judge in Colorado, and
Judge John B. Zabriskie, state court judge in New Jersey. Each of
these judges concluded that the text of the 1918 Naturalization Act
permitted the naturalization of Asian immigrant servicepersons
and veterans. For example, the Naturalization Examiner for Los
Angeles reported to the Chief Examiner in San Francisco that
Judge Trippet “went carefully over the provisions of the law and of
Section 2169. He finally gave his opinion that these petitioners
were eligible under the provisions of the Act, and granted them
citizenship.”168 Judge Hollenbeck was reported as “[taking] the view
Administrative Files (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. See In re Saichi Shimodao (D. Haw. Mar. 17, 1919) (on file with the
Naturalization Administrative Files).
164. Id. at 3–4.
165. Id. at 4.
166. Id. at 4–5.
167. JAPANESE AM. NAT’L MUSEUM, supra note 2, at 46; Naka, supra note 116.
168. Memorandum from Office of Naturalization, L.A. to Chief Examiner, S.F.

176

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 37: 1

that the that the seventh subdivision of Section 4 of the Act of May
9, 1918 superseded all prior enactments on the subject, especially
in view of the general repeal embodied in Section 26 of said Act.”169
Judge Zabriskie “construe[d the] naturalization law of May ninth
nineteen eighteen to permit the naturalization of Chinese and
Japanese in military service.”170
b. Only Filipinos and Puerto Ricans Eligible
Commissioner Campbell and a number of judges disagreed
with this reading of the 1918 Naturalization Act. They viewed the
limited repeal of section 2169 as a necessary provision to effectuate
the explicit grant of eligibility to Filipino and Puerto Rican
servicepersons and veterans. Judge Bledsoe of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California was one of
these judges.171 Judge Bledsoe had an interesting history with
interpreting the eligibility provisions. In an October 31, 1919 letter
to Senator Phelan, Judge Bledsoe explained:
Upon first reading of the statute, I considered that it entitled
Japanese to admission and so ruled with respect to the
individual Japanese then applying. Thereafter, however, upon
a more careful reading of the statute, rather complex in its
phraseology, I came to the conclusion that it did not in any way
affect the right of naturalization as provided for in the general
law theretofore in force and therefore it did not permit the
naturalization of Japanese.172

In 1921, Judge Bledsoe had the opportunity to apply his new
interpretation of the statute and denied the naturalization
applications of En Sk Song and Simeon Ogbac Mascarenas.173 Judge
Bledsoe concluded, “[i]f Congress, in the enactment of subdivision
7, had intended to make it possible for aliens of every race to become
(Apr. 7, 1919) (on file with the Naturalization Administrative Files).
169. Memorandum from Richard Wright, Naturalization Examiner, Denver, CO.
to Chief Examiner, Denver, CO. (Aug. 6, 1919) (on file with the Naturalization
Administrative Files). Judge Hollenbeck, like other judges, also expressed his
opinion that “if any man was willing to fight for the country, he was entitled to be a
citizen.” Id.
170. Letter from Assistant Attorney Gen. William C. Fitts to Sec’y of Labor (July
6, 1918) (on file with the Naturalization Administrative Files) (advising secretary of
a wire the Department of Justice received from Judge Zabriskie).
171. In re Song, 271 F. 23, 26 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1921) (holding that racial
categories could still bar naturalization except for “native-born Filipinos” who had
served because without “the presence of the exception created by subdivision 7 of the
act of May 9, 1918, they would have been denied citizenship.”).
172. Letter from Judge Bledsoe to Senator Phelan (Oct. 31, 1919) (on file with the
Naturalization Administrative Files).
173. In re Song, 271 F. at 26–27. Song was a Korean native who was a subject of
Japan, and Mascarenas was a native-born Filipino. Id. at 23.
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citizens, merely through participation in the war in our Army or
Navy, it would have been very easy for it to have said so.”174
Commissioner Campbell had made a similar argument two
years earlier. He stated:
If the act had said ‘any alien, including Japanese, etc.,’ then
there would have been a specific exception and Japanese would
have been removed from the excluding terms of section 2169
. . . . There is no such exception and therefore in lieu of it there
is pointed out the comprehensive language ‘any alien’ as
constituting the exception.175

Yet for Commissioner Campbell, the term “any alien” was
“general language” that could not create a “specific exception” to
section 2169 because to do so would make the limited repeal of
section 2169 “entirely nugatory:”176
I cannot reconcile it with any authority of which I am aware
that a legal construction which expunges a specific provision
from a law and deprives it of all meaning is a correct
construction, and if the term “any alien” is to be construed in its
broad literal sense then the Court has denied all significance to
the language “but nothing in this act shall repeal or in any way
enlarge section 2169 of the Revised Statutes * * * *.” This is an
express provision of the law that is unconditioned and
independent and must, therefore, be held to be effective. The
remaining portion of the sentence “* * * * except as specified in
the seventh subdivision of this act and under the limitation
therein defined * * * *,” is apparently descriptive of a supposed
specific exception which a perusal of that part of the section in
which it apparently should occur fails to disclose.177

That specific exception was native-born Filipinos. The grant of
eligibility to native-born Filipinos in the opening sentences of the
seventh subdivision was:
an enlargement of section 2169, since a Filipino is an Asiatic
and of the yellow race, and plainly the language reserving with
an exception section 2169 R.S. was incorporated for the purpose
of showing that Congress did not intend any further
enlargement of its terms to include others than Filipinos and
even in such case only those Filipinos specified and under the
limitations as to them which are therein defined.178

For Commissioner Campbell the issue was “whether ‘any
alien’ [was] to be broadly interpreted in its literal sense and without
restriction.”179 He concluded that it was not. For him, the
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Memorandum from Comm’r Richard K. Campbell 3, supra note 132, at 1.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
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“inevitable conclusion” was that the 1918 Naturalization Act did
“not in any ways enlarge nor d[id] it repeal section 2169 R.S., except
as to native born Filipinos of the designated age and under the
circumstances defined in the first portion of the seventh
subdivision.”180
Judge Kerrigan of the Supreme Court of California agreed:
[A]fter having said that section 2169 was not to be repealed, it
was necessary for Congress to add, ‘except,’ etc., because as a
matter of fact there were two classes mentioned in subdivision
7, namely Filipinos and Porto Ricans, who were neither free
white persons nor of African descent or nativity.181

Judge Van Valkenburg of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri similarly concluded “[t]he
exceptions referred to must have been the races especially
mentioned in the seventh subdivision, and the limitation was the
military or naval service performed. In other words, under the
general law, neither a Filipino nor a Porto Rican could necessarily
have been admitted to citizenship.”182 Judge Wolverton of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
also concluded that the only exception to section 2169 within the
seventh subdivision was “relat[ed] to native-born Filipinos and to
Porto Ricans.”183
Deputy Commissioner Crist rejected this interpretation. In a
1921 memo to the Secretary of Labor, Crist stated:
Section 2169 refers only to “aliens.” It does not have any
reference whatsoever to “persons owing permanent allegiance,”
although it has been urged that the reference in this subdivision
to the Filipino makes the only exception to 2169. The Filipino
is not an “alien” but a “person owing permanent allegiance to
the United States.” The provision regarding the Filipino
specifically excepts him from the general provisions of the
naturalization law upon service in the navy after the
declaration of intention, and not from section 2169.184

Judge Vaughan shared this perspective. In his opinion in In re
Soon Nahm Ahn, he explained “the provision relating to ‘any native
Filipino’ is not in conflict with section 2169; the native born Filipino
is not an alien, and section 2169 has no application to laws
specifically providing for the naturalization of those who are not
180. Id. at 3.
181. Sato v. Hall, 217 P. 520, 524 (Cal. July 26, 1923).
182. In re Charr, 273 F. at 212.
183. In re Sato, No. 3604-P-5214, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 1919) (on file
with the Naturalization Administrative Files).
184. Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist to
Secretary of Labor, supra note 6.
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aliens.”185 This perspective was ultimately rejected by the Supreme
Court in Toyota v. United States. There, the Court held that the
limited repeal of section 2169 only applied to Filipinos. 186
c.

Ambiguous Text

The administrative archival records include three cases in
which judges concluded that the text of the 1918 Naturalization Act
was ambiguous before the Court’s decision in Toyota. In two of these
cases the judges decided that the ambiguity should be read in favor
of the Asian servicepersons and veterans seeking naturalization. In
the remaining case, the judge concluded that ambiguity required an
examination of Congressional intent, which he decided did not
support the Asian immigrant servicepersons’ and veterans’
eligibility.
Judge Dooling of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California concluded that the text of the 1918
Naturalization Act was “broad enough to cover” the case of an Asian
immigrant service member.187 He decided that “any doubt as to the
meaning of the law should be resolved in favor of those whom the
Government thought fit to take into active military or naval service
during the late war.”188 This conclusion was supported by his
opinion that the court could do this much for “those who were
willing to fight for this Country, during the late war.”189 Judge P.C.
Evans, a state court judge in Utah, agreed with Judge Dooling’s
sentiments. The Acting Chief Naturalization Examiner reported
that Judge Evans stated “the law should be interpreted to permit
[Asian immigrant servicepersons’ and veterans’] naturalization if
such interpretation was at all permissible.”190 It appears he did find
this interpretation permissible because he granted the
naturalization petition of Hideo Kazuta.191 Kazuta was a Japanese
native and honorably discharged solider.192 Judge Evan’s reading of
the 1918 Naturalization Act was shaped by his belief that “a

185. In re Soon Nahm Ahn (D. Haw.) (on file with the Naturalization
Administrative Files).
186. Toyota, 268 U.S. at 412.
187. In re Mon Foo Yan, No. 3747 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 19, 1919) (on file with the
Naturalization Administrative Files).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Memorandum from Acting Chief Naturalization Exam’r Frederick Emmerich
to Comm’r of Naturalization (May 25, 1920) (on file with the Naturalization
Administrative Files).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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Japanese who had voluntarily entered our military forces and
served honorably during the late war was entitled to the benefits of
citizenship.”193 It does not appear that either judge was willing to
ignore the statutory text to reach this outcome, but rather that both
were persuaded that the text did not clearly answer the question.
In light of such ambiguity, it was possible for Asian immigrant
servicepersons and veterans to get the benefit of the doubt.194
Judge Kerrigan of the Supreme Court of California similarly
read the statute as ambiguous, but in the face of ambiguity he
turned to congressional intent.195 Based on an analysis of
legislative history Judge Kerrigan concluded Asian immigrant
servicepersons and veterans were not eligible to naturalize.196
Judge Kerrigan specifically pointed to the fact that “the committee
which reported the bill to Congress, in response to questions from
the floor, repeatedly said that the act would not apply to those not
capable of citizenship.”197
iii. Congressional Intent
Administrative officials and judges gave considerable weight
to their understanding of whether Congress intended to make Asian
immigrant servicepersons and veterans eligible for naturalization
through the 1918 Naturalization Act. Opinions on this issue were
split at the highest levels within the Bureau of Naturalization.198
Commissioner Richard K. Campbell concluded that section 2169
prohibited Asian immigrant servicepersons’ and veterans’
naturalization, while Deputy Commissioner Crist believed that
such naturalization was permitted. Both gentlemen had been
actively involved in the enactment of U.S. naturalization law.
Commissioner Campbell was one of three members of the
Presidential Commission on Naturalization in 1905. This
commission drafted legislation that became the 1906 Act. The main
purpose of the 1906 Act was to centralize naturalization procedures,
but both of the proposed bills submitted by the Commission
recommended limiting naturalization to “persons of the Caucasian
193. Id.
194. See In re Mon Foo Yan, No. 3747. (“the meaning of the amendment is not very
clear . . . but I believe the law should be resolved [in favor of the serviceperson].”).
195. Sato, 217 P. at 524.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 525.
198. See, e.g., Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r of Naturalization Raymond F.
Crist to Comm’r Richard K. Campbell, supra note 130, at 3; Memorandum from
Comm’r Richard K. Campbell, supra note 141 (on file with the Naturalization
Administrative Files).
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race and to aliens of African nativity or descent.”199 Commissioner
Campbell’s commitment to racial requirements for naturalization
in 1905, which excluded Asian immigrants, may have influenced his
interpretation of the 1918 Naturalization Act that amended the
1906 Naturalization Act. Commissioner Campbell noted that a
committee hearing before the passage of the 1918 Naturalization
Act “bears out” the idea that the section 2169 repeal was limited to
Filipinos.200 He thought it was obvious that “Congress believed that
there was some respect in which section 2169 of the Revised
Statutes would be operative in regard to the new matter adopted on
behalf of aliens who had been engaged in the present military
service of the United States, otherwise the reservation would have
been futile.”201
Deputy Commissioner Crist was involved in the drafting of the
1918 amendments and testified before Congress about them.202
Based on his involvement, he concluded “[t]he intention of Congress
was to make eligible for citizenship any alien who could be prevailed
upon during its greatest historical crisis to enter the military or
naval service of the United States.”203 Further, that “there were
others than white or black aliens [in the Army] was generally
understood. It was known that there were Chinese, Japanese,
Hindus, Filipinos, American Indians, and others ineligible
ordinarily to naturalize under the naturalization laws of this
country.”204 Section 2169 was “freely discussed on the floor of the
House,” and Deputy Commissioner Crist argued that Congress’
“intention was to remove section 2169 of the Revised Statutes from
consideration in the naturalization of any alien embraced within
subdivision 7.”205

199. H.R. DOC. NO. 59-46, at 97 (1905) (Purdy & Campbell proposed legislation);
Id. at 108 (Hunt proposed legislation requiring court to be satisfied that the applicant
“is of the Caucasian race, or of African nativity or descent.”).
200. Letter to Chief Naturalization Exam’r William M. Ragsdale (Jan. 9, 1919)
(on file with the Naturalization Administrative Files).
201. Memorandum from Comm’r Richard K. Campbell 3, supra note 132.
202. See, e.g., Amendments to the Naturalization Laws: Hearing on H.R. 10694
Before the H. Comm. on Immigration & Naturalization, 65th Cong. 4 (1918)
(statement of Mr. Sabath) (“I think Mr. Crist could explain the bill more thoroughly
and more intelligently, as well as in a shorter space of time, than I could. We worked
together on it, but he did most of the work . . . .”); Naturalization of Residents of the
United States: Hearing on H.R. 3132 Before the S. Comm. on Immigration, 65th
Cong. 3-27 (1918).
203. Memorandum from Comm’r Richard K. Campbell 3, supra note 132.
204. Id. at 4.
205. Id.

182

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 37: 1

Commissioner Campbell and Deputy Commissioner Crist both
had supporters within the judiciary. For example, Judge Bledsoe
and Judge Van Valkenburg agreed with Commissioner Campbell.
Judge Bledsoe concluded:
The purpose of Congress . . . was not to provide for admission of
aliens generally, who had served with us in the World War, but
merely to provide that those of them who were otherwise
eligible to admission might be admitted without being required
to execute the usual preliminary declaration, and without
completing the usual period of residence within the confines of
the United States.206

Judge Van Valkenburg similarly concluded that “[t]he history
of legislation upon this subject convincingly demonstrates the
purpose of Congress to limit applicants for naturalization to free
white persons and those of African nativity and descent.”207
Judge Vaughan offered the most detailed discussion of
congressional intent, which corresponded with Deputy
Commissioner Crist’s conclusions. Judge Vaughan explained:
We had drafted them into our service and they had thought
enough of us to serve, to risk their lives for us. Was Congress
unwilling to grant citizenship to those among them found to
possess the qualifications required of others? I do not think so.
In my opinion, Congress by repealing the clause quoted above
lifted section 2169 so as to admit them to citizenship.208

He concluded that Congress intended to treat all alien
servicepersons and veterans equally, stating “[i]f it was not the
intention of Congress thereby to provide equal treatment, or at least
fair treatment for all aliens in our service, I am unable to perceive
what Congress did inten[d].”209 In a subsequent case he reiterated
this conclusion stating, “[e]vidently Congress intended to provide
for extending the protection of citizenship to them without regard
to race or color.”210
A detailed review of the legislative history for the 1918
Naturalization Act reveals that members of Congress expressed
grave concern that the military naturalization provisions would
enable Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans to naturalize.
When members of Congress expressed such concerns, they were
constantly reassured that no such outcome was possible. For
206. In re Song, 271 F. 23, 26 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1921).
207. In re Charr, 273 F. 207, 212 (W.D. Mo. 1921).
208. In re Saichi Shimodao at *4–5 (D.C. Haw. Mar. 17, 1919) (on file with the
Naturalization Administrative Files).
209. In re Soon Nahm Ahn, 2 (D. Haw.) (on file with the Naturalization
Administrative Files).
210. In re Shimodao, at *5.
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example, Representative Moore of Pennsylvania asked how the
military naturalization provisions would “apply in the case of a
Chinaman or a Japanese. The term ‘any alien’ there is pretty broad.
It applies to a Filipino in the service. Is it possible it would apply
also to a Chinaman or a Jap?”211 Representative John L. Burnett of
Alabama assured Representative Moore that the military fast track
did not “repeal the existing law which excludes Chinese and
Japanese from citizenship.”212 Still not entirely convinced,
Representative Moore wondered whether it would be possible for an
Asian immigrant “to obtain a foothold in the Army and make that
the medium of becoming a citizen under this section.”213
Representative Hayes replied, “the purpose of this, of course, is to
admit Porto Ricans and Filipinos who are in the Army to apply for
commissions in order to have an official position in the various
Filipino and Porto Rican contingents of the Army. That is the
primary purpose of it.”214 Representative Burnett added, “[i]t would
not apply to those who are not capable of acquiring citizenship.”215
During House hearings on an earlier bill that had language similar
to that of the 1918 Naturalization Act, Representative Burnett,
Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization, asked, “[a]re there any Asiatics that are not eligible
for citizenship who are serving in any capacity on ships, and if so,
would this bill in its broad terms allow them to come in?”216 Deputy
Commissioner Crist replied, “I understand the Navy Department
allows no one in the Navy who is not a citizen of the United States,
with the exception of the Filipino and Porto Rican.”217 After
Chairman Burnett sought greater clarification, Representative
Sabath explained,“[i]t was not intended that we naturalize
Japanese or Chinese, but it is intended that we should naturalize
as many of the seaman as we can.”218 Deputy Commissioner Crist
finally stated, “[t]he Chinese could not be naturalized, because by a
specific act of Congress they are excluded.”219 He then proceeded to
quote section three of the bill, which stated, “[t]hat all acts of parts
of acts inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of this act
211. 56 CONG. REC. 6000 (May 3, 1918).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Amendments to the Naturalization Laws: Hearing on H.R. 10694 Before the
H. Comm. on Immigration & Naturalization, 65th Cong. 8 (1918).
218. Id. at 9.
219. Id.
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are hereby repealed; but nothing in this act shall repeal or in any
way enlarge section 2169 of the Revised Statutes.”220 Chairman
Burnett replied, “That probably guards it” to which Deputy
Commissioner Crist stated, “That guards it.”221 Finally, a Senate
report on the bill that was enacted explained:
[The bill] also declares that nothing in the act shall enlarge or
repeal in any way section 2169 of the Revised Statutes except
as specified in the seventh subdivision and under the limitation
therein defined. This means that Filipinos may be naturalized
who are enlisted in the Army or Navy of the United States and
are honorably discharged therefrom.222

The repeated reassurance that the seventh subdivision only
expanded naturalization eligibility to Filipinos and Puerto Ricans
was due to the text of the bill. The bill stated “[t]hat all Acts or
parts of Acts inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed; but nothing in this Act shall repeal or in
any way enlarge section twenty-one hundred and sixty-nine of the
Revised Statutes.”223 Yet the text ultimately adopted was different,
and it included the limited repeal language. In both forums, the
same concerns were raised and the same reassurances were given,
despite different texts being considered.
In Toyota, the Supreme Court examined congressional intent
and concluded that “[t]he legislative history of the act indicates that
the intention of Congress was not to enlarge section 2169, except in
respect of Filipinos qualified by the specified service.”224 The Court
concluded that Congress did not extend to Asian immigrant
servicepersons and veterans the same presumptions about cultural
assimilation that it extended to non-Asian immigrant
servicepersons and veterans.225 Their military service could not
overcome a presumption of unassimibility.226

220. Id. The language of H.R. 10694 that was discussed differed from the text
adopted in the 1918 Act. The 1918 Act language regarding section 2169 stated,
“nothing in this Act shall repeal or in any way enlarge section twenty-one hundred
and sixty-nine of the Revised Statutes, except as specified in the seventh subdivision
of this Act and under the limitation therein defined.” Naturalization Act of 1918, ch.
69, § 7, 40 Stat. 542, 547 (1918).
221. Amendments to the Naturalization Laws: Hearing on H.R. 10694 Before the
H. Comm. on Immigration & Naturalization, 65th Cong. 9 (1918).
222. S. COMM. ON IMMIGRATION, AMENDING THE NATURALIZATION LAW, S. REP.
NO. 65-388, at 8–9 (Apr. 12, 1918) (“[t]o accompany H.R. 3132”).
223. H.R. 10694, 65th Cong. (Mar. 13, 1918).
224. Toyota, 268 U.S. at 412.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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Before Toyota was decided, lower federal and state court
judges had different opinions about Congress’ intent.227 While there
is no record of judges or administrative officials demeaning the
military service of Asian immigrants, some decision makers exalted
this service and viewed it as evidence of the characteristics desired
for future citizens.228 For these decision makers, there was likely no
legitimate basis for distinguishing between Asian immigrant
servicepersons and veterans and non-Asian immigrant
servicepersons and veterans. Consequently, they concluded that
Congress could not have meant to make such a distinction. For
example, Deputy Commissioner Crist noted:
To construe this statute adversely to the solider because of his
nationality, race or creed is to repudiate those upon whom the
Nation has leaned and depended to sustain the fundamentals
upon which its national life exists. A policy of repudiation of
the solider of the country must bring about just rebuke.229

Yet other decision makers concluded that Congress intended
to maintain the racial distinctions that existed before the 1918
Naturalization Act.230 These decision makers thought Congress
viewed Asian immigrants as having different and incompatible
values, norms, and practices—thus making them unassimilable.
In Toyota, however, the Supreme Court examined
congressional intent and concluded that “[t]he legislative history of
the act indicates that the intention of Congress was not to enlarge
section 2169, except in respect of Filipinos qualified by the specified
service.”231 The Court concluded that Congress did not extend to
Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans the same
presumptions about cultural assimilation that it extended to non-

227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r Raymond F. Crist to Comm’n Richard K.
Campbell 1, supra note 130, at 5.
230. These discussions do not detail why Asian immigrants were excluded from
naturalization eligibility. However, the legislative history of the 1870 Naturalization
Act and subsequent legislation barring Asian migration and prohibiting access to
naturalization provide thorough explanations for their exclusion. Asian immigrants
were barred from citizenship “on the grounds that American politics and culture
would remain perennially foreign to them; indeed, Asians had become, in American
rhetoric, anti-citizens, embodying values and characteristics antithetical to those of
the ideal American citizen.” Salyer, supra note 4, at 856. More specifically, Asian
immigrants were viewed as disloyal pagan imperialists who lowered wages and
threatened the livelihood of hardworking Americans. See NGAI, supra note 4, at 47–
48.
231. Toyota, 268 U.S. at 412.
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Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans.232 Their military
service could not overcome the presumption of unassimibility. 233
Conclusion
Many Asian immigrants believed that military service would
enable them to demonstrate their loyalty and adoption of
mainstream American values, norms, and practices.234 The special
provisions within the naturalization laws for immigrant
servicepersons and veterans supported their belief. Like many
immigrants, Asian immigrants viewed military service as “some
indication of the feeling of loyalty expressed . . . towards the country
of their adoption.”235 Further, “most Asian men apparently joined
the armed forces in the same rush of enthusiasm stirring other
Americans and alien residents and with the added hope that
demonstrations of loyal wartime service would be a path to social
acceptance and incorporation.”236 For example, Kiichi Kanzaki, the
general secretary of the Japanese Association of America, saw the
war as an opportunity for Asian immigrants to demonstrate their
assimilation, to “dislodge the ‘theory that the Japanese are so
unshakably devoted and faithful to their country that they will
never become loyal American citizens.’”237
Kanzaki’s desire to prove Japanese immigrants’ cultural
assimilation was not simply intended to change the hearts and
minds of the American public. Rather, it was to demonstrate a legal
requirement for citizenship. The racial requirements embedded in
naturalization laws were an example of categorical decision making
rather than individualized assessments.

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Even though Asian immigrants were exempt from the draft, over one
thousand Asian immigrants volunteered for military service. Naka, supra note 116,
at 40–41. The majority of Japanese World War I veterans “were volunteers,
prompted by the feeling of loyalty and devotion to their adopted country. Such an
expression of loyalty [was] surprising and a revelation to many who had believed the
Japanese immigrants unassimilable and unpatriotic to the cause of their adopted
country.” Id.
235. Id. at 43.
236. See Salyer, supra note 4, at 854; see also Letter from Richard M. Sato to
Richard K. Campbell, (Feb. 8, 1919) (on file with the Naturalization Administrative
Files) (stating how Sato had been educated in the United States and that he was
familiar with U.S. law and the duties of a citizen).
237. Salyer, supra note 4, at 854 (citing Kiichi Kanzaki, American-Born Japanese
Loyal to United States, S.F. CHRON., at 19 (Jan. 16, 1918) (describing how the
Japanese Association of America was an important political organization for firstgeneration Japanese immigrants).
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The categorical approach creates a serious risk that
individuals who have internalized American culture will be denied
the opportunity to naturalize. This risk is particularly pronounced
when the categories do not provide accurate and reliable
information. As long as assimilation is evaluated via categorical
criteria rather than individualized assessments, it is a problematic
citizenship requirement.238 It is critically important that applicants
have the opportunity for individualized review of their specific life
story to determine whether they have internalized American
culture.
United States citizenship requirements are no longer defined
by race or demonstrated “habits of civilized life.” But concerns about
cultural assimilation continue to shape public and political
discourse about who should be eligible to naturalize.239 As a
category, unauthorized migrants are unable to become citizens
because they lack lawful permanent residence status.240 Proposals
for a pathway to citizenship are rooted in the idea that these
individuals “are Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every
single way but one: on paper.”241 Advocates for a pathway to

238. The use of assimilation proxies to categorically grant citizenship eligibility
raises similar questions about accuracy and reliability. An example of this would be
the naturalization fast track for servicepersons and veterans. Military service can be
a proxy for the internalization of American culture, but people also enlist for a
variety of instrumental reasons that have little to nothing to do with mainstream
American values, norms, and practices. Yet the use of proxies to categorically grant
access to citizenship is less problematic than the use of proxies to categorically deny
access to citizenship from an individual rights perspective. Granting a right that may
not be deserved does not deprive an individual of important rights and opportunities
the way that denying a right that is deserved does.
239. See Hailey Branson-Potts, Trump Wants Immigrants to “Share Our Values.”
They Say Assimilation Is Much More Complex, L.A TIMES (Apr. 11, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-immigrant-assimilation-2017-story.
html (“‘Not everyone in our country will be able to successfully assimilate,’ President
Trump said in a campaign-trail speech in which he called for new immigrants to pass
an ‘ideological certification to make sure that those we are admitting to our country
share our values and love our people.’”).
240. See Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the
United States, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-sta
tistics/population-estimates/unauthorized-resident (“Unauthorized immigrants
applying for adjustment to LPR status under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) are unauthorized until they have been granted lawful permanent residence,
even though they may have been authorized to work.”).
241. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June
15, 2012) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of
fice/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration). In 2012, Time Magazine had a
cover that featured a picture of Jose Antonio Vargas, a Pulitzer Prize winning
journalist and unauthorized migrant who outed himself as undocumented in a New
York Times article, and other unauthorized migrants. Jose Antonio Vargas, We Are
Americans* *Just Not Legally, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2012), http://content.time.com
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citizenship argue for individualized assessments to demonstrate
that unauthorized migrants deserve access to United States
citizenship because of their values, norms, and practices.242
Opponents argue that these individuals’ failure to abide by U.S.
immigration law demonstrates that they have not internalized
American culture.243 As long as culture remains an implicit
citizenship requirement, decision makers will struggle with
whether or not category-based criteria or individual assessments
provide the right balance between accurate and reliable decision
making and cost-effective and efficient decision making.

/time/covers/0,16641,20120625,00.html.
242. Melissa Block, Army Tightens Rules for Immigrants Joining as a Path to
Citizenship, NPR (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/22/559336282/army-t
ightens-rules-for-immigrants-joining-as-a-path-to-citizenship (quoting Margaret
Stock, arguing in favor of a path to citizenship for service people: “But what you don’t
do is label an entire group of people as security threats just because they were born
in a foreign country.”).
243. Conor Friedersdorf, It’s Silly to Oppose a ‘Path to Citizenship’ Because It’s
‘Unfair’, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2013/01/its-silly-to-oppose-a-path-to-citizenship-because-its-unfair/272618/ (quoting
Senator Ted Cruz’s remarks regarding a path to citizenship: “To allow those who
came here illegally to be placed on such a path is both inconsistent with the rule of
law and profoundly unfair to the millions of legal immigrants who waited years, if
not decades, to come to America legally.”).

